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Abstract 
 Do term limits make state legislatures more descriptively representative of their 
population? If the composition of a state legislature is a function of its ruleset and design, then 
term limits—a major shift in the rules—would change who is running for office and who is 
getting elected. In order to explore this question, a dataset was created by contacting a number of 
states to solicit responses on the demographics of their state legislatures from 1990-2018. In 
addition, information regarding some control variables (partisanship, time, economy) was 
gathered. A gap variable was created to see what difference existed between the proportion of a 
state’s total population that is nonwhite compared to the population of a state legislature. A 
larger gap means a state’s legislature is whiter than the public.  
 Term limits had a negative, significant correlation on the gap variable when controlling 
for other factors. While term limits are usually viewed as a negative in political science literature 
due to reducing the power of legislatures and inflating state budgets, this is one area where term 
limits may be viewed as a force for positive changed in making a representative democracy more 
representative.  
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Introduction 
 What institutional design choices of state legislatures impact the demographics of the 
people who run and are elected to serve in the body? Besides a pure direct democracy, every 
democratic system relies on representation of the public to craft laws and execute the duties of 
government. Some groups may be overrepresented, underrepresented, or not represented at all. 
Because of the human component of government—laws are not generated by machines nor do 
they exist in nature—who makes up an institution, such as a state legislature, is going to impact 
the outcomes of that institution. Studying the factors that influence the demographics of who 
populates a given institution can be an important tool in understanding the outcomes of the 
institution. For a legislature, whether at the state or the federal level, the laws that flow out of the 
body are a reflection of the members who make up that body at that given time. States are the 
defining feature of the American federalist system. There are 50 different governments 
throughout the nation comprised of different people, ideas, and behaviors. Because of this, they 
are a great vehicle for testing alterations to institutions as well as analyzing their impact. The 
unique structure of states allows for more innovations and ideas that would not be seen at the 
federal level.   
This paper examines one specific institutional design choice of state legislatures, term 
limits, and one potential outcome, increased descriptive representation. As term limits overcome 
the incumbency advantage by forcing members out, it is possible that these open seat elections—
in both primary and general elections—could lead to pools of candidates and elected legislators 
who are more representative of the population of the state when compared to members who were 
first elected decades ago. The history of term limits, existing research studying their impact on 
state legislatures as well as research studying the efficacy and validity (or lack thereof) of 
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descriptive representation are discussed to provide a foundation for specific analysis into term 
limits and descriptive representation. In order to accomplish this analysis, a dataset is created 
covering a time period of 1990-2018 of a sample of states on their demographics and other 
political factors as well as information from the state legislatures. Through these datasets, a 
calculated gap variable assesses descriptive representation in states and is used to test the 
existence, direction of, and the strength of a relationship between term limits and descriptive 
representation. Other factors, such as partisanship and economic health as well as the passage of 
time, are considered as other variables that could be associated with changes with descriptive 
representation within a state legislature. 
 There exists a significant correlation between the presence of term limits and descriptive 
representation. Specifically, as a state implements or enacts term limits their legislature becomes 
more descriptively representative. This effect is smaller relative to other control variables and 
factors, but is significant and meaningful as it would provide evidence for a positive 
consequence of term limits—which have been traditionally found in research to not meet their 
stated goals and, debatably, damage the health of legislatures. This finding should be explored in 
further depth due to lack of substantial literature exploring any possible link between term limits 
and descriptive representation.  
Literature Review 
Observed Impacts of Term Limits 
 Because term limits alter the status quo of how the legislature is composed, it can be 
assumed they will change the outcomes of the legislature. In the debate about whether or not 
states should pursue term limits for their state legislatures, proponents of term limits made 
several arguments about the benefits they would have for state governments: decreasing district-
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specific funding or “pork” (Herron and Stotts, 2006), reducing the influence of interest groups 
and outside actors on the legislative process (Carey et. al, 1998), making more competitive 
elections due to the reducing the incumbency advantage (Chen and Niou, 2005), and altering the 
composition of the legislature through promoting a more citizen-oriented pool of candidates 
(Engstrom and Monroe, 2006). Observed findings have either been inconclusive or have rejected 
these arguments of a linkage between term limits and these proponent arguments due to a lack of 
evidence.  
 The existing research has shown no strong relationship between term limits and reducing 
spending on pork. Some models have shown term limits can actually increase pork in the long-
run, despite the potential for short-term—one or two legislative sessions worth—reductions 
(Herron and Stotts, 2006). Other research shows term limits do not have a significant impact on 
state spending, instead other factors such as a state’s macroeconomic condition (Keele et. al, 
2013) determine state spending rates. There is an observed decline relationship in state-spending 
with the implementation of term limits, but these negative trends began before term limits and 
did not have the rate of decrease quicken after term limits. This implies that other factors are 
associated with reducing state spending.  
In addition, states that repealed term limits did not have an increase in spending—which 
would be the expected response if the claim “term limits reduce spending” is valid. If term limits 
decrease state spending, then state that repeals term limits should have an increase in spending. 
However, spending has not increased in the six states—Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming—that repealed term limits (Erler, 2007). In some cases, term limits are 
associated with an increase in pork and state spending. Their proposed reasoning for this 
statistical observation and relationship is the “common pool” problem. The problem states that 
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members, due to term limits, will not have to bear the cost of irresponsible fiscal policy as they 
will be out of the legislature due to the term limits. As such, they use the common pool of 
taxpayer resources to maximize their individual and district goals while they are in office while 
pushing the cost to the next generation of legislators. This problem, the author notes, is 
exacerbated by the institutional changes term limits make on state legislatures which exacerbate 
this problem as members are forced out of the body before these costs may be fully known.  
 Proponents of term limits argued that these institutional changes would prove to be 
beneficial for the state. One of the largest claims made was term limits would reduce the efficacy 
and frequency of interest groups in state legislatures. Early research showed the shift in power 
within a state legislature after the implementation of term limits did not lead to any change in the 
relative power of interest groups (Carey et. al, 1998). Later research showed increases in the 
relative power of interest groups after term limits are implemented (Richardson et. al, 2005; 
Miller et. al, 2011).  
The later research with interest groups found that in states where they have high observed 
power, their perceived power by the legislators is very low—whereas states where interest 
groups have lower power, the legislators consider them to have too much power. The article 
found that how strict term limits were drove the gain in power of interest groups—term limits 
that were lifetime bans with shorter terms lead to more power for interest groups, with the effect 
lesser in states where the term limit simply required sitting one term out of office. Separating the 
types of term limits can be of use for more specific results, as research has shown the effects of 
term limits can vary based on how strict they are (Alt et. al, 2011; Sarbaugh-Thompson, 2010). 
This reinforces the prevailing thought that more tenured members are more resistant to interest 
groups. Specific to Nebraska, term limits were noted by a bipartisan group of political actors 
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within the state as empowering interest groups (Masket and Shor, 2015). The respondents said 
term limits created less experienced candidates and legislators who rely more on the information 
given to them by interest groups to guide their votes.  
Whether or not this gain in power by interest groups is beneficial to the public or 
democracy is not settled. Some claim it can block popular policy if their donors do not want it 
(Lax and Phillips, 2012), while others say interest groups serve an important role in serving 
democracy by being an easy vehicle for people to become politically involved (Lewis, et. al, 
2015) which means increasing the relative power of interest groups would be a net benefit to the 
democratic power of the people. However, there is an amount of a consensus that term limits 
have not met their stated goal in reducing the power of interest groups—regardless of whether 
this is a laudable goal.  
Beyond interest groups, another noted power shift linked to term limits is the executive 
gaining relative power over the legislative branch. Term limits have been linked to fewer vetoes 
(Baker and Hedge, 2013), which the authors argue means that the legislatures are not engaging in 
conflict with the executive branch and are more apt to follow their signaling. Term limits were 
also linked to a shift in opinion on the role of the legislature in overseeing the executive branch 
and state bureaucratic agencies. In a survey of Michigan state legislators, which the authors ran 
both before and after term limits were implemented, researchers found the post-term limit 
members viewed oversight as something not valuable to do while in office (Sarbaugh-Thompson 
et. al, 2010) and outside their responsibilities. Even though executive oversight is a constitutional 
responsibility of the Michigan legislature. This is an instance of the legislature giving up their 
power to check the executive following term limits. As checks and balances are a foundation of 
 
6 
 
the American government, at both the federal and state level, this implication represents a shift 
away from the traditional norms of government.   
There are more mixed results on what impact term limits have on internal power. Some 
research finds no shifts within the power of committees after term limits (Bagashka and Hayes 
Clark, 2014). Others find that term limits weaken the power of leadership and raise the power of 
rank-and-file members (Apollonio and La Raja, 2006). This same research finds that the lower 
house in bicameral states becomes less attractive to donors and interest groups, giving the upper 
house more clout and power over policy. Research has also shown term limits shift how 
legislators behave within a body—adopting a more trustee role and valuing constituent service 
and casework less (Cooper and Richardson, 2006). Existing research shows a linkage between 
term limits and shifting power dynamics of state government away from legislatures and towards 
the executive, the bureaucracy, and interest groups. 
In addition to changes within the legislature and their power dynamics, term limits also 
alter elections. Proponents of term limits argued that they would break the strong incumbency 
advantage held by state legislators. Research specific to California explored this claim, found 
that term limits were linked to marginally more competitive elections than before their 
implementation (Masket and Lewis, 2007). There a few ways open seat elections can be 
classified: those caused by term limits, those caused by premature departure from office 
(resignation), and those caused by the member choosing not to run for re-election. The California 
study treated all of these the same for its research—a potential limitation of this study. However, 
more competitive elections should boost overall engagement among voters. Higher engagement 
and turnout, particularly among minority groups, could lead to increased descriptive 
representation. More research would need to be done to assess this assumption. As for the 
 
7 
 
incumbency advantage, the authors found that it started shrinking before term limits were 
implemented. This study questions the efficacy of term limits reducing the power of the 
incumbency advantage if it was already declining absent the presence of term limits. 
Term limits also alter who makes the decision to run for office preceding an election. 
Looking at a strategic decision-making process, prospective candidates in any race would assess 
the costs and benefits of running for office. Intuitively, term limits reduce the benefits while 
costs remain constant. This would lead to some people not running for state legislatures who 
otherwise would. Proponents argue these compositional changes are benefit—people who want 
to enter politics to make a career out of it would be dissuaded from running. Instead, citizens 
from a variety of experiences and situations in life would run for office. The idea of a “citizen 
legislatures” is one of the central arguments by proponents of term limits (Carey et. al, 1998; 
Keele et. al, 2013). This contrasts to professionalized legislatures, which are defined by their 
similarities to Congress: higher salaries, more staff, more days in session (Squire, 2007). Citizens 
legislatures tend to be more popular than professionalized legislatures (Richardson et. al, 2012), 
even though professionalized legislatures have the capacity to do more. The thinking on why this 
phenomenon occurs is the perception by the public that a more professionalized legislature is 
more vulnerable to being taken by elites (Weber, 1999). Research has found that in the aftermath 
term limits, there has not been change in the professional background of the legislatures (Erler, 
2007). The idea of term limits facilitating the transition to more citizen legislatures has not 
happened.  
There is research into term limits impact on other forms legislative composition. During 
the early research about term limits, scholars debated whether it would benefit the Republican 
party due to removing entrenched Democratic state legislators who were routinely re-elected 
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despite their districts moving to the right.  In researching this claim, Powell finds no evidence for 
the predicted gains by Republicans (Powell, 2008). Partisan turnover is not growing at the same 
rate as legislative turnover. This phenomenon may be occurring due to increased partisanship—
which leads to the same party being elected even if it isn’t the same legislator.  Other forms of 
composition include the demographics that make up the body—beyond their professional 
background. This requires on potential benefits of descriptive representation within a legislative 
body.  
Potential Benefits of Descriptive Representation 
 Descriptive representation can be defined by the question, “Does my representative share 
my background?”. In an increasingly diverse country, this concept of representation has become 
more important. The general argument on why it is relevant is because groups of people have 
shared experience and history; only through these shared points can certain policies be enacted to 
serve these communities. Whether or not these potential benefits of descriptive representation 
actually exist in practice, whether they are strong enough to overcome partisanship, and whether 
there is any evidence that voters care about being descriptively represented is the subject to much 
debate. Descriptive representation has been shown to mitigate negative policy for the given 
cultural group (Hayes and Hibbing, 2016; Arnesen and Peters, 2017).  It also has been linked to 
increases in positive policy for the group (Orey et. al, 2006; Rocha et. al, 2010). In states 
dominated by one political party, descriptive representation is a way for factions within a party to 
gain influence over the process and shift policy to be more favorable to their group (Pantoja and 
Seguar, 2003).  
Other research finds that other factors, such as partisanship or substantive representation, 
can be just as powerful if not more powerful in achieving this goal (Grose, 2005). Some 
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proponents of descriptive representation concede that partisanship may be just as powerful 
(Merolla, Sellers, and Flower 2013; James, 2011; Camobrecco and Barnello, 2003). The latter of 
which argues the way descriptive representation is thought of—that candidates and their cultural 
group will have similar views—is completely inaccurate, citing minority Republican candidates 
failing to capture a majority of their particular racial group. Other researchers argue that 
descriptive representation is dependent on individual contexts of elections and districts; it can’t 
be viewed on aggregate and applied broadly to elections (Fraga, 2016).   
 Descriptive representation also has been linked to some non-policy benefits to the public. 
Among groups that are more descriptively represented when compared to the past, it is linked to 
improving political efficacy (Merolla, Sellers, and Flower, 2013), a link to a reduction of 
political alienation (Pantoja and Seguar, 2003), and raising voter turnout (Whitby, 2007; Orey et. 
al, 2006; Rocha et. al, 2010) among the given group. Also, it has been shown to create a positive 
feedback loop effect—where descriptive representation in lower levels of government leads to 
increased descriptive representation in higher levels of government. Intuitively, this makes sense. 
If candidates for higher office are politicians who have served in lower roles—a state legislator 
running for Congress or a member of Congress running for the Presidency—then if the pool of 
politicians in lower levels are more descriptively representative over time then higher offices 
should become more descriptively representative because of this upward mobility.  
Possible Link Between Term Limits and Descriptive Representation  
Due to the constant cycling of members, term limits produce more turnover within a 
legislature as well as reducing the long-run incumbency advantage (Orr et. al, 2001, Carey et. al, 
1998). While a member may have an incumbency advantage for the times they could run for re-
election, they would not be able to have a lengthy career. By producing more open seats, term 
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limits could lead to a more descriptively representative body due to the pool of candidates being 
more diverse than when the original incumbent ran for office.  
Early research was inconclusive. Some found term limits could not be directly linked to 
increased rates of women being elected to state legislatures (Carroll and Jenkins, 2001), noting 
that other factors—such as political culture and the demographics of the district—play as 
important if not a bigger role. This connects to a limitation noted by some of the descriptive 
representation scholars; it is hard to disentangle the various factors that influence a voter. Later 
research produced a similar finding—term limits cannot be linked to increasing rates of Latino 
representation within state legislatures (Casellas, 2009). Instead, they found population rates 
within a given district were the main driver. This connects to an idea of racial constituencies 
being a better way increasing descriptive representation (James, 2011) rather than any 
institutional factors—if there are more people of a given group within a district, then more 
people of that group will be running for office and getting elected. Both authors note that part of 
the reason African-American communities are more descriptively represented than other groups 
is due to their relative geographic concentration.   
As the debate continues about whether term limits are an efficacious way of achieving the 
goals laid out by their proponents, more research is necessary to evaluate their impact on 
descriptive representation. Term limits are a transformative force in other areas of state 
legislatures—elections, power dynamics, fundraising. The existing relative dearth of research 
into their impacts on state-level descriptive representation is important to understand term limits 
as they have been entrenched in several states for decades now. This study seeks to fill the gap in 
the literature regarding term limits by exploring a possible link between term limits and 
descriptive representation at the state level. This study accomplishes this through a use of a 
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sample of states to see what broad trends exist throughout the nation in both term limit and non-
term limit states.  
Theory  
 Term limits are theorized as having an impact on the descriptive representation within a 
state legislature because of eliminating the incumbency advantage. Incumbents, in addition 
having the benefits of name-recognition and increased knowledge than an insurgent candidate, 
would likely have been first elected at a time when the electorate was less representative than the 
current electorate. Specifically, this problem would be most pertinent in Democratic party 
primaries partisan legislatures—as members would have won nominations when the 
demographics of democratic party were less diverse than the contemporary Democratic party. 
Because of term limits forcing these incumbents out, the candidates running in a primary election 
should be more representative of their party’s current coalition simply due to entering the 
election at the same time that the coalition exists and not decade(s) earlier. Term limits, by 
getting rid of the time gap that incumbency provides, would help close the descriptive 
representation gap.  
The incumbency advantage is the primary mechanism in assuming a link between term 
limits and descriptive representation. It is possible that other sources—such as competitive 
elections—could establish a causal link term limits and descriptive representation. However, 
there is not enough to fuel this assumption. Mechanically, incumbents are going to eventually be 
term-limited out of office. This would put a hard deadline on any incumbency advantage, linking 
term limits and the advantage. In having more open seat elections, in both primary and general 
elections, the pool of candidates would be more reflective of the constituency’s population 
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demographics in that moment rather than an incumbent who continuously wins re-elections who 
was first elected decades prior.  
The existing literature exploring a connection between term limits is relatively 
incomplete and lacks data from the last several election cycles. Based on the literature from the 
aftermath of term limits investigating the composition of state legislatures as well as the theories 
on term limits impact on institutions leads to a hypothesis that term limits would have a 
relationship with who makes up state legislatures.  
H1: If a state has term limits implemented, then the state will have a lower descriptive 
representation gap in their legislature 
H2: If a state has enacted term limits, then state will have a lower descriptive representation gap 
in their legislature.   
Both hypotheses focus on the descriptive representation gap and not raw numbers or 
percentages of the legislature compromised of nonwhite members due to it benchmarking to the 
state. Intuitively, a state with a high nonwhite population—such as Louisiana—is going to have 
higher numbers than a state with a low nonwhite population. Comparing the rates within the state 
(overall population, population of the legislature) allows to more accurate measure the impact 
term limits are having on descriptive representation. In an ideal world, there would be no gap—
the proportion of the population that is nonwhite would be approximately the same as the state’s 
population. However, as the data shows, this is not the case in the vast majority of cases. Term 
limits may have an impact to close this gap and make legislatures more representative of their 
state’s demographics.  
The separation of implementation and enactment of term limits is an important 
delineation in the research. It is possible that—assuming politicians and candidates are rational—
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the reality of term limits should alter the decision-making process for choosing whether or not to 
run for office even if term limits are not in effect. Some entrenched incumbents may leave before 
they are term-limited out in order to avoid being a lame duck. In addition, if a prospective 
legislator knows that they would not be able to run indefinitely, then it would alter who is 
choosing to run because of altering the input into the decision-making process of whether or not 
to run for office. Because of these reasons, there are two tests run: one with implementation and 
one with enactment. Final results are compared to see which has a stronger relationship with the 
descriptive representation gap.  
Methods 
Methods of Analysis 
 Both hypotheses are tested through a linear regression model using the term-limited 
status relevant to the specific case and descriptive representation gap variable. Also included in 
the model is a series of control variables to account for other factors which may influence the 
descriptive representation gap. For both cases these are: Democratic presidential vote share, 
unemployment rate, election year, and the factor variable for state. These variables are chosen 
because of capturing other important factors in elections: economic status (unemployment rate), 
partisanship (presidential vote share), time (year). The state variables attempt to isolate each state 
and trace its uniqueness within the model.  It is possible that conditions of a given state make it 
more or less inclined to have a smaller gap. These conditions may be nebulous or difficult to 
trace in a measurable way. As such, these are all lumped into the state variable because of these 
impracticalities which is the most feasible ways of considering these factors within the model.  
 Beyond the hypotheses, other tests are run with the data. There is a test of states which 
have term limits enacted but not yet implemented in order to see if there is a significant impact of 
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enactment of term limits—irrespective of implementation. In addition, there are visual depictions 
of trends of a selection of the variables over time to isolate their relationship with the gap 
variable and note some discoveries. Existing research explores whether or not the 
implementation or enactment matters the most in altering legislative composition. Considering 
this as an additional test may provide more evidence for whether or not enactment matters for 
composition. In all cases, linear regression is chosen because of the tendency of existing term-
limit research to quantitatively test data using some variation of a linear model. There are no 
special circumstances of this data that warrant deviation from the existing methods of similar 
research. 
There are 382 observations input into the models, which come from the 17 states over the 
1990-2018 time period. Some states are missing data in some of the time periods, which results 
in 51 missing values. This is the result of some states only having partial result, such as Texas 
which stopped collected information on racial background on their legislators after 2004 or 
others like Massachusetts which had only infrequent measures. In the “Appendix” section, a list 
of covered states and what time periods they have is provided. In all statistical tests, the data is 
compiled in an Excel spreadsheet with calculations and coding occurring in that sheet. Then, the 
data is transferred to R for the statistical tests as well as generating tables and visual 
representations of the data.  
Data  
 In order to test these ideas, a dataset is created through a variety of sources. The time 
period covered in this dataset is 1990 to 2018. These years are chosen because it captures 
legislative sessions before enactment and implementation, during the period of enactment to 
implementation, and after implementation in the term limit states. The large time covered 
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benefits the results as it shows the long-term, and not just short-term, impacts of term limits. It 
could be that there is a slight bump in descriptive representation after enactment or 
implementation but that as the years or decades pass it fades away. Some state legislature 
reported their information separated by chamber whereas others reported as the whole body. 
However, based on the existing literature there is not enough evidence to believe this would 
impact the descriptive representation gap. In addition, because some states have members who 
cycle from one chamber and back, the gap should not result as a function of the legislative 
chamber which means it would not be input into the model. While research does indicate term 
limits can change perceptions of chambers in a bicameral system to external actors such as 
donors and interest groups, it does not find a change in perception amongst candidates or elected 
members or the public. However, because unique conditions could persist in one specific state, 
the individual state is considered in the model as a potential factor of the descriptive 
representation gap.  
 The process of obtaining the demographic information about the state legislatures 
involved reaching out to various agencies within 44 states that had public research offices or 
libraries that may have this information. The states of Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, New York, 
Oklahoma, and Utah were not contacted as they lacked any public office to contact. Of the 
remaining 44 states that were contacted, 17 states responded with either partial or complete 
information over their legislature’s demographics. These 17 states over the time period is sample 
for the research and are listed in the “Appendix” section in both the data tables as well as a map 
showing the states (Figure 1). Consequences of the missing values—both within the state and as 
well as considering states that did not respond—are included in the “Discussion” section. 
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To complete the input for the descriptive representation gap, population demographics of 
the 17 states are collected. The formula for calculating the variable is: the proportion of the total 
population that is nonwhite less the proportion of the legislature that is nonwhite. The nonwhite 
population totals of the states are found in one of two ways. For census years 1990, 2000, and 
then every year 2008 onwards there are exact figures provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. For 
the remaining years, the population proportion is estimated using a linear growth formula that 
assumes a constant rate of growth. This presents certain limitations explored in the “Discussion” 
section. Information on term limit enactment and implementation comes from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)—which has information on annual term-limit status 
within each state separated by enactment and implementation.  These two provide the primary 
independent and dependent variables for the research. Information on how they are coded and 
tested are expanded upon in the next two sections. 
 In addition to these data points, information is collected on other factors within states in 
order to give alternative explanations for the descriptive representation gap. The first is 
presidential vote share, measured by the percentage going to the Democratic candidate. Since the 
time periods are measured based on the year (i.e. the 1990 members were elected in 1988/89), 
the presidential vote is applied to that cycle (1990 and 1992 would have 1988 Presidential 
Election results, 1994 and 1996 would have 1992). The raw election data is collected from the 
Federal Election Commission and calculated into a percentage based on the democratic share of 
the vote. This is used as a proxy value for overall state partisanship. Other metrics—party 
registration numbers, vote totals in gubernatorial races, or party distribution of state legislature—
are alternative figures that could have been used. Presidential vote share is chosen because of the 
limitations of the alternatives. Party affiliation, whether in the legislature or among the public, 
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does not necessarily correlate with ideology—especially in the early time periods of the research. 
Consider the high number of registered Democrats in Appalachia, despite it being a relatively 
solidly conservative area. When choosing between presidential vote share and gubernatorial 
races, the former is chosen as the proxy for partisanship because of how it is less effected by 
local factors. Gubernatorial races can be defined by local issues that do not necessarily break on 
political lines whereas the federal race of the Presidency is more likely to be defined by issues 
that break on ideological lines. Because the purpose of this political variable is to trace to 
partisanship, a focus on issues that would break on partisan lines would be more accurate for this 
case.  
Unemployment rate, measured in the election year that elected that session, is considered 
as a proxy of overall economic health of the state. Unemployment is a flawed number for 
economic health: it tracks only those who are participating in the labor force, it does not consider 
wage growth over time, it does not account for consumer saving/spending rates or business 
investment trends. However, it is a frequently used metric for economic health because of it 
having a strong relationship to booms and bust—when the economy is healthy, it is unlikely 
there would be high unemployment and vice versa. The input data came from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, which records state-by-state unemployment data on an annual basis dating back 
to 1976. Economic conditions of the state are considered because of the impact they have on the 
decision in the ballot box. Because of nonwhite members representing a change to the system, it 
could be the case in terms of economic slowdown (represented by high unemployment) or 
growth (represented by low unemployment) voters be more or less inclined to change from the 
status quo.  
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Time, represented by the year, is also considered as a possible factor that influences the 
descriptive representation gap. Over time, it is possible that—due to increasingly diverse 
populations—the gap shrinks as nonwhite populations represent a larger coalition of the 
electorate. If a state had 10% nonwhite population, it is unlikely politicians would focus as much 
of their campaigning on them as if they had a 20% or 30% group. In addition, it is possible that 
attitudes shift over time among the white population, becoming more accepting of voting for 
nonwhite candidates. By controlling for time, it accounts for these shifts that exist independent of 
other factors.  
 “Term Limit Enacted” and “Term Limit Implemented” are binary dummy variables 
coded as “0” meaning no and “1” means yes. In addition, there is a variable “Term Limits 
Enacted but Not Implemented” to consider the time period after enactment but before 
implementation. Just as before, “0” meaning no and “1” means yes. The gap variable is measured 
by the difference between the proportion of the population that is not white and the proportion of 
the legislature that is not white. If the gap is positive, it means there is a higher proportion of the 
state’s population that is nonwhite than the legislature’s population.  Because of this, a gap closer 
to 0 is the ideal—the further from 0 it is, the more out of balance. While there are some gaps 
where the legislature is over-representative (8.9% of cases measured), these are far from the 
norm.  
Presidential vote share is reported as the Democratic percentage of the vote. Because of 
how the Democratic party has a more racially diverse coalition, the impact should be negative on 
the gap—as there are more Democrats in the state, there should be a smaller descriptive 
representation gap. This assumes that the party would be electing members representative of 
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their coalition in that election—which fits into the idea of term limits transitioning nominated 
members as to being more descriptively representative of their party’s coalition.  
Unemployment is measured as the percentage reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
While the ideal would be to get unemployment in the time of the election (i.e. November of the 
given year), the BLS report that covers enough of a time period only reports annual totals. Year 
is measured by the year of the prior election for that session—1990 would be 1988 (or 1989 in 
Virginia) and so on. While this would not capture every member perfectly due to the staggering 
of seats, it is the best possible proxy given that the state’s do not report which individual 
members are nonwhite and could not trace their exact election year.  
The state variable is coded as a factor in R because it is a categorical variable that does 
not naturally translate to quantitative format. This allows the model to consider each state 
independently and generate individual results for each state. The state variable is treated as a 
factor with Delaware, the first start, being the benchmark of comparison. In the data tables in the 
“Appendix” section, all of the coefficients for the various states are relative to Delaware and only 
have use in relation to the Delaware case.  
 Some states reported the demographics of their state legislature delineated by chamber. 
Some states only reported one specific chamber. In total, there were 195 datapoints from state 
houses and 226 from state senates—Maryland reported their information as a total legislature 
and Nebraska is a Unicameral, so these two are both coded as “Legislatures”. While this is not 
considered in the main model, consideration is given to the chamber to see what differences may 
exist in the gap between the chambers.  
Results 
Hypotheses 
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 In both of the cases—enacted and implemented—the relationships, while varying in 
strength, are all of the same class of significance and direction. The full output results are found 
in the Appendix section. The term limit variable has a negative, significant relationship with the 
descriptive representation gap which is the predicted result based on the existing literature and 
theory surrounding term limits. Other factors may have a stronger relationship with the 
descriptive representation gap, which may indicate that term limits are not the most effective tool 
for closing the descriptive representation gaps at the state levels as their proponents argued. 
Nevertheless, there being a significant relationship existing in the predicted direction does 
provide a level of evidence for the assertions made by term limit proponents—which has not 
been the case for the majority of these assertions. The results indicate that the presence of term 
limits are linked to a shrinking descriptive representation gap, which would be a positive 
outcome of term limits.  
Presidential vote share has a stronger relationship (~.2 for enacted, ~.21 for implemented) 
compared to the term limit factor. This coefficient is positive, which means as the Democratic 
vote share in the state goes up there is a noted increase in the size of the gap. Election year, in 
both cases, has a significant relationship but it is even smaller (~.004 for enacted and 
implemented) than term limits. Figure 2 conveys this by displaying the gap over time.  
Unemployment rate was not significant at the .05 level in either case, though was significant at a 
.1 threshold for enactment. In both cases, unemployment rate has the largest coefficient value 
(~.25 in enacted, ~.23 in implemented). This implies that, based on unemployment rate being a 
proxy of economic health, in poor economic conditions (rising unemployment) the descriptive 
representation gap grows. Exploring if this holds in other samples and what is the mechanism 
behind this would be a positive contribution to the existing literature of descriptive 
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representation. The state variables, as described earlier, try to capture the idiosyncratic factors of 
each state which are not represented in the existing control variables. In all cases and tests, 
relative to the benchmark of Delaware, the states had a negative and significant relationship with 
the descriptive representation gap variable. This means that all of the states—for some 
unidentified reason outside of the purview of the model—have smaller descriptive representation 
gaps when compared to Delaware.  
Additional Test—Enacted but not Implemented 
 When comparing the enacted but not implemented results to the existing cases, a few 
observations emerge. The term limit variable, while barely missing significance at the .05 
threshold (with a value of .052), acts in the opposite direction from the other two. As term limits 
are enacted but not implemented, a positive association is noted with the descriptive 
representation gap variable. This differs from the enactment and implementation variables which 
have a negative relationship. However, the coefficient is smaller than the previous two (~.01)—
indicating a relatively weak relationship. One possible reason for the relatively weaker 
relationship compared to the other term limit variables occurring could be the relatively few 
cases of enactment without implementation—as this only captures a few years within the term 
limit states data. The relationship may indicate that the underlying assumption to the idea of 
enactment, and not implementation, driving changes in legislature composition may be flawed. 
Legislators and prospective candidates may not value the chance of indefinite careers highly 
enough to not run for office if they cannot run indefinitely—meaning that this additional cost 
(term limits) does not tilt the scales so much to outweigh the personal benefits of running for 
office. This would also imply that legislators and the candidates are less anticipatory than 
assumed; only responding to changes to the institution when the changes actually happen.   
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 The control variables all bare similar results compared to the other two cases—
unemployment lacks significance (in this case at both a .05 and .1 threshold), election year has a 
negligible relationship, and presidential vote acts as before. The coefficient for unemployment is 
larger than the coefficient for presidential vote share, which differs from the previous two cases. 
The state factor variables all act as before, with the same having significant relationships and in 
the same directions. The underlying ideas on why these relationships are occurring in the way 
they do should hold from the previous two cases to this one—no circumstances have changed 
beyond how term limits are measured.  
 Figures 3 visualize the descriptive representation gap one over nonwhite population and 
the other over presidential vote share respectively. There are two interesting clusters of data 
points—one with a negative gap and the other around .6 nonwhite population with a relatively 
stagnant gap that break the trend. The negative gap means that there are more nonwhite 
legislators as a proportion of the legislature than the total population. This cluster is populated by 
New Mexico’s state legislature in the 1990s. Because of how much this differs from the other 
datapoints; it bears further discussion. It is possible that New Mexico’s rapid increase in 
nonwhite population (going from 22.5% to 31.4% in the measured years of 1990 to 2000, a 
change of 8.84%, which is the largest rate change over that subperiod) has something to do with 
these datapoints having an abnormal relationship compared to the rest of the sample.  
The .6 nonwhite population data points with a stagnant gap is also New Mexico, this time 
in the 2010s period. Of all the states in the sample with reported totals on demographics of 
legislators, New Mexico has the highest proportion of their population that is nonwhite. This 
could represent a possible source of future investigation if states with majority nonwhite 
populations have negative or negligible descriptive representation gaps. However, it also could 
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be the case that there is something unique to New Mexico that makes them be a state with a 
lower gap compared to others. Studying other majority nonwhite states, such as Hawaii, would 
be valuable in determining what impact this has on descriptive representation—as Figure 3 
demonstrates, the gap increases with population until a certain point where it falls off. The 
implication from the graph would be that there comes a point where the population becomes so 
diverse that descriptive representation appears to be occurring more successfully.  
Figure 4 shows the descriptive representation gap as a function of partisan affiliation. The 
gap increasing as the Democratic vote share of a state goes up seems contradictory to a few 
assumptions about American politics: more diverse states should be more Democratic, more 
Democratic states should have more liberal views on race, and more diverse states should be 
electing more diverse politicians because of the pool of potential candidates being more diverse. 
When looking at this sample of states, as shown in Figure 1, as nonwhite population increases 
there is an increase in the Democratic presidential vote share. Figure 5 also shows that more 
Democratic datapoints are associated in this sample with more diverse states. Yet, the more 
Democratic datapoints are associated with a larger descriptive representation gap. The likely 
mechanism at work here is that Democratic states are more diverse in terms of their proportion, 
so they have a greater capacity to lag behind in the gap. A hypothetical state with 40% of their 
population as nonwhite with a 20% nonwhite legislature has a larger gap than a state with a 20% 
nonwhite population and a 1% nonwhite legislature. Further research would be needed to fully 
explore why this is occurring.  
Figures 6 and 7 are box plots showing the distribution of the gaps between the two 
legislative chambers. With one exception of Florida’s 2016 senate—which had no reported 
nonwhite members despite Florida’s population being 44% nonwhite—senates are not 
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significantly more or less descriptively representative of their states than houses on balance. The 
range for senates when excluding the outlier is .456 (becoming .583 if 2016 Florida Senate is 
included) and the range for the houses is .468. The median gap for state senates is .089 
(unchanged by including or excluding the Florida case) and the median gap for houses is .076. 
The average value across the chambers are .082 for state houses and .098 for senates when 
excluding Florida 2016 (when including it the value is .1)—a greater difference exists amongst 
the averages (.016-.18) than the medians (.013) or the ranges (.012 if the outlier is excluded), but 
none of these are substantial. These findings within this sample gives credence to why there is 
not substantial literature exploring descriptive representation difference between houses of state 
legislatures as there is nothing to indicate that patterns on descriptive representation behave 
differently across the legislative chambers.  
Discussion 
Limitations 
 The limitations on the outcomes of the research stem from two wider groups: those from 
the input data and those from the methodological choices in order to arrive at the outcomes. In 
the former category areas such as sampling and estimation for missing values require further 
discussion. In the latter, the choice to use a gap variable to measure the descriptive representation 
poses questions as well as does the choice to measure using an assumption of a linear 
relationship. In all cases, reasons for these fit into various categories: lack of data for certain 
states in certain time periods, assumptions based on existing research, or missing a better 
alternative.  
 One of the largest limitations on the research is the sample of states used for analysis. As 
explained in the “Data” subsection of “Methods”, the data needed for this research is not kept by 
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a majority of states nor is it covered in every legislative session within the time period. There is 
significant variance from states to state in how they record—or if they record at all—the 
demographics of their legislature. Ideally, all 50 states would have records of this data going 
back to cover the entire time period to give greater assurance about the conclusions found within 
the dataset. However, only a small proportion of states have this information on file and even 
fewer states have it over the entire time period studied. Some states, like California, did have the 
information but only accessible in a physical location and could not be distributed over the 
Internet or through the mail. Because each state is their own government with their own rules 
and behaviors, issues arise when trying to construct a dataset of all states for information that 
would only be counted on the state level like demographics of legislators.  
 Even within the states that did report data, there is variance in what years they cover and 
how much information they collect. Some states within the sample like Texas stopped collecting 
information on demographics of state legislators after the 2004 session. Others, like New 
Mexico, did not begin collecting information until 1996. Finally, some like Massachusetts and 
Washington, relied on external information collected by the NCSL for their own research into 
demographics and descriptive representation which had a similar—but not the same—time 
period. Unfortunately, while the NCSL would disclose this information to the individual states 
upon request, attempts to contact the NCSL to obtain their dataset on demographics of state 
legislators proved to be unfruitful to obtain a complete record of the information they keep on 
demographics of state legislatures.  
In addition, some states recorded information on all nonwhite legislators whereas others 
only collected information on a certain ethnicity or a couple of ethnicities. All of these are 
treated equally for the research in order to easily map it to a model. However, this could be a 
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source of error or inaccuracy in the findings of the research as not all states are using the same 
information to be put in as the input data. Treating them all as the same is done because of the 
limited sample size. If more states had reported some information on the demographics of their 
state legislature, it would have been more feasible to separate the states based on how they 
reported it. In absence of this the best possible outcome was to treat all the states equally. 
Nevertheless, the states’ information covers different pools. Ohio only counted African-
American legislators which contrasts to New Mexico only considered African-American and 
Hispanic legislators which contrasts to Montana which counts legislators of all ethnicities and 
reports them separately. This caveat is important to consider on the use of these findings because 
of how the total state population input considers all nonwhite population whereas some of the 
legislatures only consider specific nonwhite groups. However, because it is necessary to rely on 
the information provided by the states, it would be impossible to run a survey of every legislator 
dating back to 1990 on their racial identity and it would be improper to assume racial identity 
based on pictures or rosters.  
As the map shows, the states which did have data tend to be geographically clustered in 
the Midwest as defined by the Census Bureau. While there a few states on the coasts or in other 
areas, a plurality of the states (8/17) occupy one geographic region—with four South Atlantic 
states, two Mountain states, one Pacific state, one West South Central state, and one New 
England State. It is possible that some factor within the Midwest region could impact the results 
and make them not as representative as the nation as a whole when compared to a hypothetical 
sample of states more geographically representative of the nation.  
Two reasons the sample of states turned out to be relatively geographically clustered 
could be that these states are more prone to keep records on the demographics of their state 
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legislature for some tradition/cultural/historical reason unique to this region. It is also possible 
that the sampling could be because, as a student at a Midwest school, these states may have been 
more willing to work with me and disclose information that they otherwise would not. In 
contacting with the states, a few of the individuals did mention having a personal connection 
with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. This could have motivated the individuals to look for 
the records which would have biased the sample.  
Continuing with input data, the estimation of missing values for nonwhite population is 
another major limitation on the research. Because of the Census Bureau only reporting data for a 
portion of the years (1990, 2000, and 2008 onwards), the remaining years are estimated 
assuming a rate of constant, linear growth. If a state had a nonwhite population of 15% in 1990 
and 20% in 2000, then the four two-year cycles in-between are assumed to grow at a constant 
rate of 1% a year. This is obviously not how population trends work in practice, but in the 
absence of the actual data this is the best possible compromise in order to estimate the 
information and be able to calculate the gap variable based off of it. 
  Regardless of the merits of using this as the measure of descriptive representation, the 
fact that there are missing values for both sides of the gap variable means that this specific gap 
itself is limited in its use. However, the choice to use the gap variable to measure descriptive 
representation makes sense as it is discussed in this particular research. As the goal of the 
research is to compare the population of the state to the legislature, the idea of the gap is the best 
metric to test descriptive representation within each state and see what factors may have a 
relationship with it. From this perspective, the ideal descriptive representation gap would be 0. 
However, there are other ways of testing descriptive representation. On a theoretical level, the 
argument exists that a positive descriptive representation gap would not be less-than-ideal—as it 
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is treated within this research—because it is impossible to “overrepresent” groups that have 
historically been without power. From this perspective, the way the gap variable is treated would 
limit the use of it depending on how descriptive representation is considered on a theoretical 
level.  
Conclusion 
 When assessing the value of term limits as an institutional design choice to shift the 
composition of state legislature, the results give evidence to both sides of the debate arguing 
whether or not term limits can increase descriptive representation within state legislatures. A 
significant, negative relationship exists for both the tests on the enactment and the 
implementation of term limits with relation to the descriptive representation gap variable—which 
indicates that as term limits are enacted/implemented, there is an association with a decline in the 
descriptive representation gap. In how descriptive representation is measured in this research, 
that association would indicate a more descriptively representative body.   
 As the term limit movement has slowed down significantly since the 1990s and early 
2000s, research can now further assess their impact on the behavior of legislators and the 
composition of the bodies. There are now decades of datapoints that can be used to establish 
trends before, during, and after enactment and implementation of term limits. These datapoints 
can provide greater support for identified relationships with term limits and certain conditions 
within a legislature such as political ideology or demographics of legislators. Future research 
investigating the relationship between term limits and descriptive representation can take 
advantage of this to obtain greater confidence in the findings. Future research should also seek to 
obtain a greater sample of states that is more geographically representative of the nation as a 
whole. The greater sample size would give more certainty about the findings. In addition, a 
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larger sample size would give more clarity on patterns across legislative chambers within the 
states. This also could be used to explore differences in the demographics of people who are 
elected to state houses versus state senates—whether there are any differences at the state-level 
that mirror those observed at the federal level in the dichotomy of individuals elected to the 
House of Representatives versus the Senate.  
 If the underlying assumption for term limits having a relationship with improving 
descriptive representation within a legislature is the increase in the number of open seat elections 
without an incumbency advantage, other conditions within a state could be studied to see if these 
lead to an increase in open seat elections. In addition, it is possible that this assumption is 
unfounded and needs to be tested further. Future research could look at a sample of states to 
assess whether there are more descriptively representative results following open seat elections. 
Similarly, as this research focused at the state level, future research could investigate descriptive 
representation at a district-level in a pool of states. With increasing consideration of district-
design following court cases and public debate on gerrymandering, this research may have value 
in seeing if there are factors of district-design choices (geographic compactness, prioritizing 
making coalitions of racial groups) that aid or hinder descriptive representation.  
Further research could also explore the economic side of the descriptive representation—
are there certain economic factors associated with more or less descriptive representation in 
legislatures? While this research in inconclusive on that question, it could be that unemployment 
is not the best proxy variable to use or that there should be multiple economic indicators used in 
tests: inflation, consumer price index, or interest rates could be other factors to consider. If 
economic slowdowns lead to a default to the racial status quo of politicians, this would be a 
troubling finding for the long-term prospects of overcoming an unrepresentative legislature.  
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Increased exploration of partisanship with descriptive representation also may be needed—as the 
results from this research contradict the assumption that Democratic voters would be more likely 
to vote for nonwhite members; though as explained earlier this could be a result of these states 
having higher nonwhite populations which increases the size of the gap.  
Term limits have been a major shift in state legislatures over the last few decades. They 
have been the largest change on state legislatures since the trend of professionalization of state 
legislatures in the 70s. Analyzing their impact on all facets of government within the states is 
crucial as they are felt for generations to come in the outcomes of the state legislative process. 
How they impact who runs for office, what laws come out of the state, and how power is divvied 
up within the state government are key questions to answer as term limits become more 
entrenched within the past.   
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Appendix 
Maps of States in Sample 
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States and Years Covered 
States Years Chambers 
Delaware 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Florida 1990-2016 Senate 
Iowa 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Illinois 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Kansas 1990-2016 House and Senate 
Massachusetts 1992, 1994, 2000-2004, 2008, 2010, 2016 House and Senate 
Maryland 1990-2018 Legislature 
Minnesota 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Missouri 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Montana 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Nebraska 1990-2018 Legislature 
New Mexico 1994-2018 House and Senate 
Ohio 1990-2018 House and Senate 
Texas 1990-2004 House and Senate 
Virginia 1990-2018 Senate 
Washington 1992, 1994, 2000-2004, 2008, 2010, 2016 House and Senate 
Wisconsin 1990-2018 House and Senate 
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Data Tables 
Table 1: Term Limits Enacted 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept -8.291112 0.527786 -15.71 < 2e-16 *** 
Term Limits Enacted -0.035794 0.009528 -3.757 0.0002 *** 
Presidential Vote 0.205884 0.052368 3.932 0.0001 *** 
Unemployment Rate 0.254381 0.151166 1.683 0.09323 . 
Election Year 0.004187 0.00027 15.495 < 2e-16 *** 
States           
Florida -0.089596 0.014646 -6.118 2.4E-09 *** 
Iowa -0.141917 0.009696 -14.64 < 2e-16 *** 
Illinois -0.073998 0.009832 -7.526 3.8E-13 *** 
Kansas -0.06479 0.012252 -5.288 2.1E-07 *** 
Massachusetts -0.085711 0.011852 -7.232 2.6E-12 *** 
Maryland -0.064815 0.011818 -5.485 7.6E-08 *** 
Minnesota -0.114635 0.009635 -11.9 < 2e-16 *** 
Missouri -0.094382 0.012671 -7.449 6.3E-13 *** 
Montana -0.109644 0.013373 -8.199 3.7E-15 *** 
Nebraska -0.056432 0.01509 -3.74 0.00021 *** 
New Mexico -0.202942 0.010234 -19.83 < 2e-16 *** 
Ohio -0.139024 0.012702 -10.95 < 2e-16 *** 
Texas -0.159919 0.013038 -12.27 < 2e-16 *** 
Virginia -0.028969 0.012249 -2.365 0.01852 * 
Washington -0.029926 0.011179 -2.677 0.00775 ** 
Wisconsin -0.141352 0.00968 -14.6 < 2e-16 *** 
 
For States: Delaware used as benchmark 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.03698 on 382 degrees of freedom (50 observations deleted due to 
missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.7888, Adjusted R-squared:  0.7778  
F-statistic: 71.35 on 20 and 382 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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Table 2: Term Limits Implemented 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept -8.987645 0.553374 -16.24 < 2e-16 *** 
Term Limits Enacted -0.040992 0.007787 -5.264 2E-07 *** 
Presidential Vote 0.213827 0.050687 4.219 3E-05 *** 
Unemployment Rate 0.236354 0.148619 1.59 0.1126   
Election Year 0.004533 0.000282 16.055 < 2e-16 *** 
States           
Florida -0.095785 0.013058 -7.335 1E-12 *** 
Iowa -0.141872 0.009532 -14.88 < 2e-16 *** 
Illinois -0.073875 0.009667 -7.642 2E-13 *** 
Kansas -0.063327 0.011978 -5.287 2E-07 *** 
Massachusetts -0.085838 0.011642 -7.373 1E-12 *** 
Maryland -0.065069 0.011616 -5.602 4E-08 *** 
Minnesota -0.114519 0.009472 -12.09 < 2e-16 *** 
Missouri -0.102898 0.010717 -9.601 < 2e-16 *** 
Montana -0.114999 0.011935 -9.636 < 2e-16 *** 
Nebraska -0.060467 0.014489 -4.173 4E-05 *** 
New Mexico -0.203221 0.010059 -20.2 < 2e-16 *** 
Ohio -0.144793 0.010917 -13.26 < 2e-16 *** 
Texas -0.156326 0.012802 -12.21 < 2e-16 *** 
Virginia -0.028863 0.012028 -2.4 0.0169 * 
Washington -0.033494 0.010952 -3.058 0.0024 ** 
Wisconsin -0.141108 0.009514 -14.83 < 2e-16 *** 
 
For States: Delaware used as benchmark 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.03636 on 382 degrees of freedom 
  (50 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.7958, Adjusted R-squared:  0.7851  
F-statistic: 74.45 on 20 and 382 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
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Table 3: Term Limits Enacted but not Implemented 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept -7.782383 0.51005 -15.26 < 2e-16 *** 
Term Limits Enacted 0.014967 0.007698 1.944 0.0526 . 
Presidential Vote 0.254026 0.051852 4.899 1E-06 *** 
Unemployment Rate 0.236907 0.153196 1.546 0.1228   
Election Year 0.00392 0.000261 15.051 < 2e-16 *** 
States           
Florida -0.121495 0.012897 -9.42 < 2e-16 *** 
Iowa -0.140865 0.009821 -14.34 < 2e-16 *** 
Illinois -0.074642 0.009962 -7.493 5E-13 *** 
Kansas -0.058078 0.012322 -4.713 3E-06 *** 
Massachusetts -0.088598 0.011988 -7.391 9E-13 *** 
Maryland -0.066387 0.011969 -5.546 5E-08 *** 
Minnesota -0.113563 0.00976 -11.64 < 2e-16 *** 
Missouri -0.127136 0.010621 -11.97 < 2e-16 *** 
Montana -0.138744 0.011756 -11.8 < 2e-16 *** 
Nebraska -0.072974 0.01484 -4.917 1E-06 *** 
New Mexico -0.201039 0.010358 -19.41 < 2e-16 *** 
Ohio -0.171061 0.010505 -16.28 < 2e-16 *** 
Texas -0.155797 0.013213 -11.79 < 2e-16 *** 
Virginia -0.025533 0.012381 -2.062 0.0399 * 
Washington -0.034988 0.011313 -3.093 0.0021 ** 
Wisconsin -0.139888 0.009803 -14.27 < 2e-16 *** 
 
For States: Delaware used as benchmark 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 0.03747 on 382 degrees of freedom 
  (50 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.7832, Adjusted R-squared:  0.7718  
F-statistic: 68.99 on 20 and 382 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Graphs 
Figure 1: Presidential vote over Nonwhite Population 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive Representation Gap over Time 
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Figure 3: Descriptive Representation Gap over Nonwhite Population  
 
Figure 4: Descriptive Representation Gap over Presidential Vote Share  
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Figure 5: Nonwhite Population over Democratic Presidential Vote 
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Figure 6: Box Plot of House Descriptive Representation Gaps  
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Figure 7: Box Plot of Senate Descriptive Representation Gaps 
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